hoping to limit overindebtedness at the source. 6 Countries that ignore the problem face the possibility of ending up like South Korea, which recently spent billions of dollars to bail out leading financial institutions that faced crippling levels of default and insolvency, 7 or the United States, which faces a growing crisis centered on rapid increases in foreclosure rates. 8 Perhaps the most common response has been to amend the legal system for dealing with financial distress. Even if financial distress is an inevitable by-product of a modern capitalist economy, 9 differences in the formal legal system affect individual responses to financial problems. Most obviously, the rise of consumer debt in recent 6 For example, the U.K. ' Even in countries that have had bankruptcy systems for many years, the rising levels of insolvency in recent decades have driven major reforms. 11 Policymakers have struggled with whether -and how -to alter their systems. Hence, the U.S. has adopted reforms designed to limit access at the same time as the U.K. and Japan have implemented reforms to encourage more filings. Which approach is correct? Should legislators permit access by a greater number of debtors, to encourage entrepreneurial risk-taking? Or, should they limit access to a smaller number of debtors to lower the moral hazard of an easy release from obligations? 12 What is the best way to filter out the 10 In addition to the sources cited 'Above in note 2', see Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen The disparate responses reflect the likelihood that variations in filing rates rest on different factors in different countries. Some of the variation is attributable to different levels of indebtedness. Some of the variation is attributable to different cultural attitudes about financial failure. Some of the variation is attributable to the accessibility of the legal system as a remedy for irremediable financial distress. Some of the variation is attributable to the availability of informal systems of relief. Yet it is not easy to disentangle how those different attributes affect the aggregate nation-level filing rates.
This Chapter explores the possibility that aggregate empirical data can shed light on that question, and analyzes the policy implications of the differences in nation-level filing rates.
First, Part II explains why it is important as a matter of policy to understand whether high or low filing rates stem from economic, cultural, or legal causes. Without understanding why rates are high or low, it is impossible either to assess whether the rate of filing is too high or too low, or to design policies likely to move rates in the appropriate direction.
Drawing on prior work about credit card markets, 14 Part III uses aggregate data to distinguish between the economic explanations for filing rates and the cultural and legal explanations. Two findings are salient. First, the bulk of the uniquely high filing rate in 13 The phrase is from Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
14 Mann, 'Above n 7'.
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the United States appears to be attributable to economic conditions, not cultural attitudes or the legal system. Second, after controlling for economic conditions, Canada's filing rate is by far the highest of any of the countries for which adequate data is available, the other countries being the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia.
15
Part IV offers tentative hypotheses to explain the more robust findings in Part III.
Thus, it considers both why Canada's propensity to file is so much higher than that of the U.S., and why Australia's is so much lower. The discussion of Japan and the United Kingdom is more tentative, primarily because of limitations in the data 16 that make the statistical findings considerably more ambiguous than they are for Canada, the U.S., and Australia. Generally, I hypothesize that "back-end" issues related to the timing of a discharge and the payments required to obtain it are relatively unimportant. "Back-end" issues matter primarily to the relatively small sector of bankruptcy filers with significant income or assets. For the great mass of potential filers who have little or no income or 15 I study these countries because they are the only ones for which I have been able to obtain a sufficiently long time series of data to permit meaningful quantitative analysis. 16 In the case of the U.K., the apparent problem is that England and Wales have one bankruptcy system, Scotland another, and Northern Ireland no system at all. Thus, statistical models that work well in countries with nationwide bankruptcy systems do poorly in the U.K. At least in theory I could limit my analysis to England and Wales, but the data for my control variables extends to the entire U.K. and I have been unable to locate a time series of data for my control variables that is limited to England and Wales. In the case of Japan, the apparent problem is an unusually long recession that has lasted throughout the study period, so that the data does not include filings from the same mix of economic good and bad periods as the other countries.
-8 -February 4, 2008 Draft assets, the most important issues are "front-end" barriers to filing, whether they come from procedural obstacles or from cultural attitudes about financial distress.
Part V concludes with a normative assessment of those "front-end" barriers.
Because those barriers tend to bar filings by the desperately insolvent (the "low-income low-asset" or LILA debtors), they reflect poor policy choices. The net social benefits of returning the LILA debtors promptly to productivity support a simple and effective system of relief for those debtors.
II. WHY THE REASONS MATTER
The first step in analyzing nation-level filing rates is to confront the matrix of factors that affect those rates. Although a rigid categorization is arbitrary, it is useful to distinguish among three different types of factors, each of which relates to financial distress and bankruptcy in a different way and each of which has different policy implications.
A. Legal Explanations
Although I am predisposed to doubt the importance of purely legal explanations, 17 I start there, primarily because of the conventional wisdom that legal explanations are central to the problem. The intuition relies on a rational actor conception of the debtor: fewer debtors file for bankruptcy in countries with bankruptcy systems that offer relief that is less generous, and more debtors file for bankruptcy in countries that offer relief that is more generous. The analytical premise is that the bankruptcy discharge provides an economic benefit to those that file, and systems in which the benefit is greater should 17 See Mann, 'Above n 7, at 96-98' (explaining that differences in legal protections have little relation to the pattern of debit and credit card use).
-9 -February 4, 2008 Draft produce more filings. 18 The literature written from this perspective suggests that the key variables in explaining filing rates are the ready availability of a discharge, the types of debts excepted from the discharge, and the scope of required post-bankruptcy payments.
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That explanation is consistent with the U.S. filing rate. The world's highest filing rate is associated with a system in which a discharge is almost automatically and immediately available and with no general requirement of post-bankruptcy payments to creditors. Similarly, Michelle White's work shows that the propensity to file is higher in U.S. jurisdictions with higher exemption levels and thus more generous bankruptcy relief.
20
The conclusion that the level of filing rates depends for the most part on the legal system makes it easy to adopt responsive policies. For example, countries like the U.K. Conversely, legislators concerned that spiraling filing rates reflect abuse should interpose obstacles to the discharge or increase the likelihood that filers will be obligated to make post-bankruptcy payments to their creditors.
B. Cultural Explanations
A second possibility recognizes the interaction between the formal legal system and the society in which it is embedded. Cultural predispositions might affect the decision to file for bankruptcy, and those predispositions may differ from country to country. That perspective recognizes that the decision to file for bankruptcy is a permanent one that will have lifelong consequences for the individual that makes it. Hence, if this explanation were important, filing decisions should diverge from those predicted by a rational-actor conception of the bankruptcy decision: individuals might refrain from filing for irrational "emotional" reasons even if the benefits available to them from a bankruptcy filing exceeded the out-of-pocket costs connected with the filing.
Cultural attitudes about bankruptcy also should affect the legal system itself. Iain 
C. Economic Explanations
The final possibility resonates with the opening paragraphs of this paper, connecting the increase in financial distress and bankruptcy filings to the rapid increase in consumer debt (and especially credit card debt) in most developed countries. The premise of this explanation is that bankruptcy filings for the most part are the result of exogenous shocks, which result in financial distress that would lead to filings in most cases without regard to legal or cultural factors.
If this explanation were important, the most significant predictors of nation-level filing rates would be consumer debt, credit card debt, and general economic conditions.
Again, United States data support this theory. It is striking that the United States for years has experienced both the highest level of credit card debt in the world and the highest bankruptcy filing rate. Econometric models that scholars have used to illustrate connections between rising debt levels and increased filing rates buttress that intuition.
29
Economic explanations would support intervention in the consumer credit markets. For example, a jurisdiction concerned about excessive insolvency might adopt regulations that limited the profitability of lending to those in severe financial distress, hoping to truncate that lending without undue distortion of the payment system or the broader lending market. 
III. ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON FILING RATES
The starting point in empirical analysis of consumer bankruptcy systems is the wide disparity in filing rates across national borders. includes both the number of liquidation or "straight" bankruptcy filings and also the applicable systems for "rehabilitations" or "proposals" or "plans." 31 Each of the five countries has both types of system. 32 The second number separates out the number of liquidation or straight "bankruptcy" filings.
In isolation, Figure 1 suggests that the U.S. has by far the highest rate of filing, with steadily decreasing filing rates in Canada, Japan, Australia, and the U.K. Although 31 The Appendix includes a more complete set of charts showing a time series of those filings for each country from 1990 to the present. 32 As Figure 1 illustrates, including or omitting rehabilitation filings does not alter the relative number of filings for any country except the United States, which has a much higher share of rehabilitation filings than other countries. The more common use of the rehabilitation system in the U.S. may be attributed in part to the maturity of the Chapter 13 system and in part to the value of that system for retaining home and automobile ownership. In none of the other countries in my study would the rehabilitation filing interfere with the ability of a lender to pursue collateral such as a home or automobile.
-15 -February 4, 2008 Draft the disparity is striking, it should be clear from the discussion above that the raw numbers say little about the cause of the disparity. Without further information, it is impossible to tell whether the disparity relates to differences in the systems themselves or rather to cultural differences or differences in economic conditions.
FIGURE 1: 2004 INSOLVENCIES PER MILLION OF POPULATION
As it happens, it is possible to identify the economic factors that affect the level of insolvency filings in a particular jurisdiction. In prior work focused on the relation between credit card debt and financial distress, I developed a model that documents a strong and significant relation between changes in the level of credit card debt and changes in bankruptcy filings. The model used credit card debt, credit card spending, total consumer debt, and unemployment (as independent variables) to explain the number of bankruptcy filings (as the dependent variable). Generally, the data suggest, an increase of $100 in credit card debt per capita will be followed one year later by an increase in -16 -February 4, 2008 Draft bankruptcy filings of about 200 per million. 33 As the magnitude of the filing rates in Figure 1 illustrates, that effect is large enough to have substantial practical significance.
As I worked with the data I began to explore how the effect differed from country to country. Even when I added variables (country dummies) to isolate country-specific effects, however, the relation between credit card debt and bankruptcy filings remained significant. What led me to this project was the surprising finding that the U.S. was not at the top of the scale. Specifically, controlling for economic conditions, the coefficient on the United States variable did not suggest that there is a higher propensity to file in the United States than in the other countries. Intrigued by that finding, for this project I updated the data used in that work (to reflect additional years of filings) and also segregated the data to permit separate analysis of liquidation filings, rehabilitation filings, and total filings. My intuition was that data about liquidation filings might be more useful than data about total filings, at least in part because rehabilitation filings in many countries are more closely related to informal or voluntary resolution schemes.
Moreover, stark differences in the relation between rehabilitation filings and secured credit suggest that those filings might be used for such different purposes in different countries as to make cross-border comparisons meaningless. 34 Ultimately, the central 33 See Mann, 'Above n 7, at chapter 5'. 34 A Chapter 13 filing in the United States is commonly used to prevent a foreclosure on a home or repossession of an automobile. In none of the other countries in this study would a rehabilitation filing bring with it an automatic stay that would grant that protection. This differential benefit from a Chapter 13 filing is a good explanation for why the rate of -17 - rehabilitation filing is culturally and legally less significant (Japan, for example), it would be better to examine the smaller number of people that take the more complete step of filing a "straight" or liquidation bankruptcy. The tables and regression analysis in this Chapter consider both metrics.
As summarized in Table 1 , 35 Canada moves to the top of the list once the creditrelated variables are accounted for, at least for total filings and liquidation filings. As the more detailed information in the Appendix explains, large standard errors suggest that the estimates of the coefficients on the country dummies are relatively imprecise. 36 The relations are statistically significant only for the United States and for Australia, and in Australia only for liquidation filings. Still, the pattern of negative coefficients is striking:
the coefficients are negative for each country's total filing propensity and its liquidation rehabilitation filings in the United States is significantly higher than the rate in Canada, although the rates of liquidation and total filings are higher in Canada than in the United States. 35 Although Table 1 does not report it, the results confirm and extend the analysis reported in Charging Ahead, because credit card debt remains highly significant with a substantial positive coefficient in all of the different runs, generally significant at a .001 level.
Talbe A1 in the Appendix includes more detailed output. 36 It would be surprising if the model did capture all of the variation because there have been substantial bankruptcy reforms in several of the countries during the period of the study. As discussed 'Above note 16', problems with the U.K. and Japanese data make it easy to see why the model does not produce significant results for those variables.
-18 -February 4, 2008 Draft filing propensity. This suggests that, faced with similar patterns of debt and unemployment, the bankruptcy filing rate would be higher in Canada than in any of the other countries. To put it another way, the data suggest that the high filing rate of the U.S. is largely attributable to the economic conditions captured in the model. Once we control for those conditions, the U.S. gives way to Canada as the nation with the highest propensity to file. This presents a new puzzle for analysis: why, holding economic conditions equal, Canada should have such a higher "propensity" to file than the USA and Australia. For convenience of exposition, the remainder of the paper uses the term "propensity" to reflect this analysis -the extent to which the per capita filing rate in a country is affected by variables other than economic conditions. The next section of the Chapter explores that puzzle. ** indicates significance at the 1% level, * at the 5% level, and # at the 10% level. Table A1 in the Appendix includes more detailed information about the regressions.
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IV. THE PATTERN OF INDIVIDUAL BANKRUPTCY FILINGS
The point of Part III is that the economic precursors of bankruptcy filings are the easiest to discern and quantify. The object of this part is to resolve the two puzzles most clearly suggested by Table 1 : why Canada's propensity to file is so much higher than that of the United States and Australia.
38
Because the cultural factors are the hardest to quantify, this Part begins by identifying features of the legal systems that are likely to explain the disparities set out in Table 1 . The discussion generally rests on three hypotheses. First, the ease or speed of "back-end" legal factors like the discharge is not useful in explaining filing rates.
Second, the legal factors with the largest effect on filing rates are "front-end" factors such as the procedural barriers or obstacles to filing; this factor is central to explaining the difference between Canada and the U.S. 39 Third, where no pattern of legal differences appears, it is reasonable to consider whether the residual cause is a strong cultural predisposition.
A. Why Is the Canadian Propensity to File Higher than the U.S. Propensity?
The most intriguing problem is to explain the disparity in filing propensity between Canada and the U.S. Examining the two countries' systems at a very high level of 38 Given the ambiguity of the findings related to the U.K. and Japan, I leave that subject to another day. -20 -February 4, 2008 Draft generality, they provide a good empirical test of the hypotheses about front-end and backend factors. First, the U.S. discharge is considerably more generous than the Canadian discharge, which would support a lower Canadian filing propensity if the terms of discharge were the most important factor. Conversely, the Canadian bankruptcy process is relatively more accessible than the American process, which would support a higher
Canadian filing propensity if accessibility were the most important factor. My conclusion is that the data support the hypothesis that accessibility is a more important predictor of propensity than the generosity of the discharge. Again, tying the analysis back to Part III, the argument is that, once we account for the markedly higher level of credit card debt in the United States, we would expect Canada's filing rate to differ from that of the U.S. even more than it does. The reason that it does not is that Canada's relatively accessible bankruptcy system discourages less filers than the relatively inaccessible U.S. system. Osgoode Hall Law Journal 15, 24. Ziegel reports data indicating that out of 83,000 1998 discharge applications, 93% of debtors received an unconditional discharge, 7% a suspended discharge, and less than 1% received conditional discharges or were denied discharges. Ziegel, 'Above n 4, at 39.
-22 - On the other hand, the procedures for instituting a bankruptcy in Canada are much simpler than the United States procedures. The prospective bankrupt initiates the proceeding by filing a simple standard-form assignment. The fee is CAN$75 for summary administration (cases with less than $10,000 in assets, more than 90% of all cases 44 ) and CAN$150 for regular administration. 45 The typical consumer bankrupt does not retain an attorney, though it must pay the fees of the trustee. 46 There is no mandatory examination by creditors, and no "abuse" provision that might force the debtor to use the alternative "proposal" system.
47
There is a mandatory counseling requirement (introduced in 1992), but it occurs after the filing, not before. 48 In the United States, the process is much more cumbersome. The forms are considerably more complex, and BAPCPA has only made them more so. Indeed, it is clear that the timing of bankruptcy filings is affected to a considerable extent by the need to collect the information 44 Ziegel, 'Above n 4, at 19'. 45 BIA Rules § 132; Duggan, 'Above n 4, at 870'. 46 Ziegel, 'Above n 4, at 18'. It is difficult to generalize about the levels of Canadian trustee fees, which in some cases might approximate the fees of U.S. attorneys. See 'Below note 50'. 47 Ziegel, 'Above n 4, at 20-21'.
48 BIA § § 66.13, 157.1; Duggan, 'Above n 4, at 887-90'.
-23 - The juxtaposition of those distinctions with the substantial difference in propensity to file provides powerful support for the hypotheses about legal precursors. If the economic features of the discharge and future income payments -the "back-end" effects of bankruptcy -were an important precursor of a high propensity to file, then it is surprising that they weigh so heavily against a relatively high propensity to file in Canada. Conversely, the difference between Canada's streamlined procedures and the burdensome procedural obstacles in the United States cuts in the same direction as the propensity data presented in Part III.
B. Why Is the Canadian Propensity to File Higher Than the Australian?
The second puzzle is how to distinguish Australia from Canada. As Part III illustrates, Australia and Canada in Table 1 (the propensity to file after accounting for economic conditions) is roughly equivalent to the difference in raw filing rates illustrated in Figure   1 . The next question is whether legal or cultural factors can explain the difference.
-25 - Pre-screening of consumer bankruptcy petitions is not unique to Japan. It also is a common feature of Nordic bankruptcy systems. See Kilborn, Sweden, 'Above n 2, at 443-444'. 56 Ziegel repeatedly notes the difference in filing rates, but does not undertake to explain it. Ziegel, 'Above n 4, at 94, 106'.
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Cultural Explanations
If neither economic explanations nor legal explanations are fruitful, an obvious possibility is that cultural explanations provide an explanation for the observed pattern.
Because cross-border cultural explanations are inherently nebulous (like dark matter), any such explanation necessarily is speculative. That is particularly true here, where the cultural factors would have to be remarkably powerful to explain the disparities identified in Figure 1 and Table 1 . Still, the juxtaposition of nearly identical legal systems and similar economic conditions with starkly different filing rates justifies exploration of the possibility.
One objective place to look for indicators of a strong cultural disposition against bankruptcy is statutes that impose substantial legal disabilities on those who file for 57 -29 -February 4, 2008 Draft to publicize the process. 61 It is difficult to evaluate that perspective as an overarching explanation. For example, given the low esteem for lawyers and the legal process in the U.S., many would regard the practical need for lawyers in the U.S. bankruptcy process as an obstacle. A purely administrative process might in practice be much more accessible.
On the other hand, I take Ramsay's central point to be that the private professionals are central in increasing public awareness and receptivity to the bankruptcy process. Even in the U.S. advertising by lawyers appears to play a role in developing a cultural perception of bankruptcy as a routine solution to financial distress. 62 If that is the significance of private professionals, then it is hard to be sure that their appearance is not an effect of a relatively receptive culture rather than a cause. In either case, Ramsay's thesis is consistent with the pattern I identify here. 63 As Tony Duggan has pointed out to me, Ramsay's thesis leaves unexplained why a culture that is by hypothesis so opposed to bankruptcy would embrace a legal system that on its face is so receptive to bankruptcy. One obvious possibility is that Australia tolerated such a system because filing rates remained low. When filing rates rose in the late 1990's to levels that were remarkably high by Australian standards (though still far below typical rates for the U.S.
and Canada), Australia responded by restricting the relief available to those that file. As -30 - In a way, the central puzzle the data presents is why Canada's propensity to file is so high, given relatively low levels of debt. One possibility could be that Canadian debt is riskier or more perilous in some way that aggregate data cannot reveal, so that the same level of credit card and other borrowings in Canada would result in higher bankruptcy filings than in other countries. However, the best evidence about global credit card markets makes that hypothesis implausible. If anything, Canada's use of payment cards appears to be considerably more benign than the use in the United States and Australia.
64
That suggests that we must look to legal or cultural explanations. With respect to the United States, the most salient distinction that would explain a relatively higher propensity to file is Canada's decision to make its bankruptcy system so accessible, particularly for those in more desperate condition. With respect to Australia, distinctions are even more elusive because it is difficult to identify any feature of the legal system that makes Canada's bankruptcy system more accessible than Australia's. Recognizing that the inquiry is speculative, it does suggest that cultural predispositions against bankruptcy are remarkably stronger in Australia than in Canada, reinforced by the greater presence of marketing and advertising in Canada.
suggested above, see 'Above n 53', it is not yet clear that those reforms will have a permanent or substantial effect on filing rates. 64 Compared to the United States market, Canada's use of debit cards is much more common and its level of borrowing in payments transactions is much lower. See Mann, 'Above n 7 chs. 9-10'.
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If we set cultural explanations to the side, the most important conclusion in Part IV is that nation-level filing rates depend much more on front-end procedural obstacles to filing than they do on back-end issues about the timing and conditions of a final discharge. This was surprising at first, because it is in considerable tension with the conventional understanding that high filings plague the U.S. system because of its undue
laxity. Yet on reflection, two points make this finding easier to accept.
The first is a behavioral point, that the typical potential bankrupt will pay more attention to those parts of the legal system that are more immediate and less to those that will not have direct effects until weeks or months after a bankruptcy filing. The typical client will be more concerned about the detailed financial records to be produced and the Considering non real-estate assets (the only likely sources for distributions to creditors), the median value of assets was less than $10,000, far below the median value for all families (more than $40,000).
68
The Consumer Bankruptcy Project, however, does not say anything about how many more people, similarly desperate, are excluded from the system by the procedural obstacles discussed above. The best evidence of the size of that population will be evident whenever post-BAPCPA filing rates become sufficiently stable to allow us to discern the size of the decline attributable to that statute. Figure A5 shows suggests the significance of this group to the total filing rate.
If marginal filers with no substantial assets or income are a large portion of the potential bankrupts, marginal filers also are those for whom there is the greatest divergence between the private and social value of the bankruptcy filing. As discussed above, the economic value of a bankruptcy filing for a debtor with little income and few assets is relatively small, because the debtor gains relatively little from the discharge.
However, the net social value of the discharge is considerable. On the one hand, the discharge harms third parties relatively little, because even without a discharge creditors would collect little of their debts from this class of bankrupts. On the other hand, society gains considerably from the discharge, because it is central to redeployment of the debtor's human capital. The premise of the bankruptcy discharge is that it increases the 69 For a detailed discussion of the various factors that affect the size and duration of that gap, see Mann, 'Above n 62'.
70 See Mann, 'Above n 62'.
-35 -February 4, 2008 Draft likelihood that the discharged can move forward with their lives, engaging in productive economic activity -jobs, tax payments, and attention to their family -and decreases the likelihood that they will drift into positively harmful activities -drug use, crime, and the like. 71 The more a legal system can facilitate that redeployment, the greater the net social benefits from the system.
72
Given the decades of experience that the U.S. has had with its bankruptcy system, it is surprising that the U.S.
has not yet come to grips with the reality of the lower middleclass bankrupt who has no substantial income or assets. Many other countries have rapidly developing and widely used systems for "no-income, no-asset" or NINA filings. -36 - 82 See Kilborn, 'France', 'Above n 2, at 655-61'.
-38 -February 4, 2008 Draft debtors, 83 is a purely administrative process. For individuals that cannot reasonably be expected to make any substantial payments, processing at the lowest possible transaction costs should be the goal. The U.S., by contrast, continues to use a "one size fits all" system, with procedural obstacles that are wastefully obstructive for much of the bankrupt population.
The evidence points toward bankruptcy simplification. 84 The time has come to abandon the complicated structures, laden with bureaucratic hurdles and special-interest provisions worthy of the Internal Revenue Code. At least for the desperately insolvent, with no substantial income or assets, the best process is one that is stripped down to its most central elements. First, the system should function as an administrative process designed to provide a service at the lowest possible transaction cost rather than as an 83 I am reluctant to proliferate acronyms but the NINA terminology is highly misleading, because the filings are not limited to those with no income or assets at all, but rather to those who have no substantial income or assets. It is also unfortunately confusing that the same term has come into common use to describe no-document real-estate mortgages in the subprime sector in recent years. have broader social problems (patterns of drug abuse, dysfunctional family lives, etc.), and that the bankruptcy process might be an ideal opportunity to respond to them. As noted by commenters at the Berlin conference for which this paper was prepared, European insolvency reform has taken that problem much more seriously than American reform has.
-39 - Judicial staff and attorneys in the U.S. already work hard to process these cases economically, but the excessive requirements of the post-BAPCPA process waste social resources.
Second, the system should provide complete and unconditional relief as quickly as is practicable. This should occur within days or weeks after the filing, not months or years. Again, when the debtor has low levels of income and assets, delaying or conditioning the discharge only delays the return of the debtor to productive economic activity unburdened by the overhang from the debts of the past.
Finally, the system should impose stern criminal sanctions for fraud, with adequate resources to ensure prosecutorial vigilance. A simple and expedient process will collapse if it is tainted by fraud. Among other things, the cultural perception of those who have gone through the process will turn negative, making it harder to persuade the "honest but unfortunate" debtor to take advantage of the process. The simplest way to avoid that problem is with an oversight system that imposes sufficiently severe penalties on abusive filers. If we want to make a cultural point, the point to be made is that abuse # -significant at .1 level * -significant at .05 level ** -significant at .01 level *** -significant at .001 level
The table reports the coefficient, the robust standard error in parentheses, and the tstatistic below. The coefficients are in filings/million. Canada is the omitted case, so the coefficients indicate the extent to which filing rates under the same conditions would fall short of (or in the case of rehabilitation filings, exceed) Canadian rates. The regressions use robust clusters to control for autocorrelation in the time series.
